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introduces choice-set forms, [b] links choice-set forms and OR forms, and [c] links KS forms and simple forms. (This figure shows the tree, the choices, and the information sets of each form. The figure does not show players.)
Linking choice-set forms and OR forms
The second contribution of this paper is to build a formal connection between choiceset forms and OR forms. This formal equivalence will require two qualifications, because choice-set forms are slightly less general than OR forms in two regards. First, choice-set forms implicitly impose no absentmindedness in the sense of Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 . Second, they implicitly impose no shared alternatives in the sense that two information sets are not allowed to share the same (feasible) alternatives (i.e., choices).
Theorem 3.1 shows that every OR form with no absentmindedness and no shared alternatives is equivalent to a choice-set form. Conversely, Theorem 3.2 shows that every choice-set form is equivalent to an OR form with no absentmindedness and no shared alternatives. Thus the theorems show (given no absentmindedness and no shared alternatives) that there is a logical redundancy at the heart of the OR specification: sets of past choices can unambiguously replace sequences of past choices. 2 All five specifications are essentially equivalent, even though they are fundamentally different in how they specify nodes and choices. (A minor issue is that only OR forms and KS forms allow absentmindedness. Section 7.1 discusses absentmindedness, shared alternatives, and two other minor issues).
Linking OR forms, KS forms, simple forms, and AR forms
Let an "AR form" be a discrete extensive form as defined by Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016a (henceforth AR16 ). An example AR form appears in Figure 1 .1. Such forms extend the specification of von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 . Incidentally, AR16 also defines non-discrete extensive forms for differential and yet more general games. Such non-discrete forms are beyond the scope of this paper. The current literature 1 does not provide a formal connection between OR forms and AR forms. This may be surprising because some prominent and valuable articles 2 have tangentially and informally suggested otherwise. It seems that the misstep was caused by improperly combining the following two (correct) results from AR16. [a] AR16 Example 6.5 (page 145) essentially says that OR trees constitute a special case of "simple trees". This accords with Figure 1 .2's top line, which shows that OR trees specify nodes as choice sequences while simple trees specify nodes as abstract entities. [b] AR16 Theorems 6. 2 and 6.4 (pages 139 and 147) say that "simple forms" 4 Peter A. Streufert are equivalent to AR forms. This equivalence is repeated here as Theorems 6. 1 and 6.2, and is shown between the last two columns of Figure 1 .2. Together, [a] and [b] might seem to suggest that OR forms are special cases of AR forms. But this logic would be faulty because [a] concerns only trees while [b] concerns entire forms. 3 Thus the reasoning does not provide a formal link between OR forms and AR forms.
Fortunately, it only remains to link OR forms and simple forms because [b] links simple forms and AR forms. Further, part of this remaining gap is bridged by Kline and Luckraz 2016 (henceforth KL16) . They essentially show that OR forms are equivalent to "KS forms", where the initials K and S correspond to Kuhn 1953 and Selten 1975 . This equivalence is repeated here as Theorems 4. 1 and 4.2, and is shown between the OR and KS columns of Figure 1.2. 4 Thus it yet remains to link KS forms and simple forms. KS forms and simple forms are similar in that they both specify nodes as abstract entities (as shown in the top row of Figure 1 .2). However, KS forms and simple forms differ in that KS forms specify their choices as abstract entities, while simple forms specify their choices as sets of nodes (as shown in the second row of Figure 1 .2).
The third contribution of this paper is to bridge this gap between KS forms and simple forms. This new equivalence appears as Theorems 5. 1 and 5.2, and is shown between the KS and simple columns of Figure 1 .2. With this missing piece in place, it emerges that all five specifications are essentially equivalent. This provides game theorists with a wide spectrum of equivalent specifications.
Organization
Sections 2-6 of this paper move from left to right across the five specification in Figure 1 .2. Section 7 considers the minor qualifications in the theorems, and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each game specification. Finally, the four pairs of equivalence theorems in this paper suggest four equivalences between subcategories of a category of game forms. First steps in this direction are Streufert 2017 and 2016.
Choice-set forms
The following game specification is new.
Let N be a set of nodes n, and let C be a set of choices c. By assumption, each node is a set of choices. In other words, each node n satisfies n ✓ C. A node can be either a finite set or an infinite set. Let T be the set of finite nodes t. In other words, 3 The distinction between tree and form can be subtle. AR16 and the present paper use "tree" to mean nodes and precedence, and use "form" to mean a tree together with choices, information sets, and players. [a] concerns trees. In particular, there is nothing in AR16 Example 6.5 that concerns the choices of the simple specification. (The choices of the OR specification do appear in AR16 Example 6.5, but only because OR nodes are specified in terms of those choices.) 4 KL16 uses the word "tree" differently than it is used in AR16, the present paper, and much of the literature. In particular, their theorems show the equivalence of "OR-trees" and "KS-trees", where a "KStree" is defined to be a tree augmented with choices. Accordingly, their "KS-tree" is about halfway from a tree to a form (as this paper and much of the literature uses those two terms).
Equivalences among Five Game Specifications ... 5 let T = { n2N | n is a finite set }. A choice-set tree is a pair (C, N) such that [cs1] N is a nonempty collection of subsets of C,
[cs2] (8t2T r {{}})(9!c2C) c2t and t r {c}2T, and
To understand [cs2], let a last choice of a finite node t be any choice c2t such that t r {c} is also a node. In other words, let a last choice of a node be any choice in the node whose removal results in another node.
[cs2] requires that each nonempty node has a unique last choice. For example, the pair C = {a} and N = {{a}} does not satisfy [cs2] because T = N and the node t = {a} does not have a last choice. In contrast, the pair C = {a} and N = {{}, {a}} does satisfy [cs2] because {a} is the only nonempty finite node and its last choice is a. For another example, the pair C = {a, b} and N = {{}, {a}, {b}, {a, b}} violates [cs2] because both a and b are last choices of the node {a, b}. In contrast, the pair C = {a, b} and N = {{}, {b}, {a, b}} satisfies [cs2]. Finally, consider the set C of choices and the set N of nodes shown in the top left diagram of Figure 1 .1. This pair of sets satisfies [cs2] because each of its eight nonempty nodes has a unique last choice.
To understand [cs3], note that this equation relates the infinite nodes (that is, the members of N r T ) to the finite nodes (that is, the members of T ). By definition, a chain in T is a subcollection T ⇤ ✓ T such that any two distinct nodes t and t 0 in T ⇤ satisfy t ⇢ t 0 or t t 0 . The union of an infinite chain of finite nodes is obviously an infinite set. The ◆ direction of [cs3] requires that each such union must be a node. For example, the pair C = Z and N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} violates [cs3] because [a] and [c] [T ⇤ = {4, 5, 6, ...} / 2 N. In contrast the pair C = Z and N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} [ {{4, 5, 6, ...}} satisfies [cs3] . Meanwhile, the ✓ direction of [cs3] requires that every infinite node is the union of an infinite chain of finite nodes. For example, the pair C = Z and N = {{}, {4}, {4, 5}, {4, 5, 6}, ...} [ {{4, 5, 6, ...}, {5, 6, 7, ...}} violates [cs3] because {5, 6, 7, ...} cannot be constructed as the union of an infinite chain of finite nodes. Incidentally, the ✓ direction of [cs3] implies that every infinite node is countable. It also implies, with the help of [cs1]- [cs2] , that {} 2 T . 5 Call {} the root node. Now derive two entities from a choice-set tree (C, N). First, define (C t ) t2T at each t by C t = { c2C | c / 2t and t[{c}2T }. Thus each C t is the set of choices that are feasible at the node t. Second, define X = {t2T |C t 6 =? }. Call its members the decision nodes. Then assume
[cs4] considers a collection of sets. Call each of its member sets an information set. Note each {t2X|c2C t } is the set of decision nodes from which the choice c is feasible. Routinely, the same set is generated by multiple choices. That set is the information set from which those choices are feasible.
[cs4] requires that these constructed information sets cannot intersect. The familiar properties of information sets then follow. 6 Peter A. Streufert In particular, [a] the collection of information sets partitions the decision-node set X, 6 and [b] two nodes in the same information set have the same set of feasible choices. 7 For example, consider the choice-set tree defined by C = {a, b, e, f} and N = {{}, {a}, {b}, {a, e}, {a, f}, {b, e}}. Here X = {{}, {a}, {b}}, C {} = {a, b}, C {a} = {e, f}, and C {b} = {e}. Thus {t2X|e2C t } = {{a}, {b}} and {t2X|f2C t } = {{a}}. These two sets of decision nodes are unequal and intersecting, in violation of [cs4] . In contrast, consider Figure 1 .1's choice-set tree (the figure's dashed line is irrelevant at this point). In other words, consider C = {a, b, g, d, e, f} and N = {{}, {a}, {a, g}, {b}, {a, d}, {b, e}, {b, f}, {a, d, e}, {a, d, f}}. Here X = {{}, {a}, {b}, {a, d}}, C {} = {a, b}, C {a} = {g, d}, and C {b} = C {a,d} = {e, f}. Thus [i] {t2X|a2C t } = {t2X|b2C t } = {{}}, and [ii] {t2X|g2C t } = {t2X|d2C t } = {{a}}, and [iii] {t2X|e2C t } = {t2X|f2C t } = {{b}, {a, d}} (the figure's dashed line shows this set [iii] ). These three sets of decision nodes are disjoint, as [cs4] requires. They are the form's (constructed) information sets.
Further, let I be a set of players i, and let (C i ) i2I assign a set C i of choices to each player i. A choice-set form is a pair ((C i ) i2I , N) such that ([ i2I C i , N) is a choiceset tree which satisfies [cs4], and in addition, [cs5] (8i2I, j2I r {i}) C i \C j = ? and [cs6] (8t2X)(9i2I) C t ✓ C i . [cs5] requires that each choice is assigned to exactly one player. Thus [cs6] implies that all a decision node's choices are assigned to exactly one player. Thus [b] (two paragraphs above) implies that all an information set's choices are assigned to exactly one player. This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely notes that the set of outcomes is N r X = (N r T )[(T r X). The set N r T consists of the infinite nodes, and the set T r X consists of the finite nodes that are not decision nodes. Later, preferences can be assigned over N r X, or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over N r X.
OR Forms

Definition
An OR form here is identical to a game in Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 (page 200) without the players' preferences. This specification is repeated in KL16 (page 86). 8 6 To prove this, first note that each information set is nonempty by inspection (empty sets of the form {t2X|c2C t } arise from choices c that are never feasible, and [cs4]'s construction simply discards them). Second, the information sets are disjoint by [cs4] itself. Third, the union of the information sets is a subset of X because each information set is a subset of X by inspection (incidentally (8c2C) {t2X|c2C t } = {t2T |c2C t }). To show the reverse inclusion, take any t ⇤ 2 X. Its C t ⇤ is nonempty by the definition of X, and so, there exists c ⇤ 2 C t ⇤ such that t ⇤ 2 {t2X|c ⇤ 2C t }.
7 To prove this, suppose both t 1 and t 2 belong to the information set {t2X|c A 2C t } and yet C t 1 6 = C t 2 . Without loss of generality, the inequality implies that there exists c B 2 C t 1 r C t 2 . Thus t 1 2 {t2X|c B 2C t } and t 2 / 2 {t2X|c B 2C t }. Then {t2X|c A 2C t } and {t2T |c B 2C t } intersect because they both contain t 1 , and yet they are unequal because the first contains t 2 Let C be a set of choices c, and letN be a set of nodesn. By assumption, each node is a sequence of choices. In other words, each node is of the formn = (c k ) K k=1 , where
This paragraph derives three entities from an OR tree. First, letT =N r C • be the collection of finite sequencest belonging toN. Second, define (Ct )¯t 2T at eacht by Ct = { c2C |t (c)2T }, wheret (c) is the concatenation of the finite sequencet with the one-element sequence (c). Thus each Ct is the set of choices that are feasible at the nodet. Third, defineX = {t2T |Ct 6 =? }. CallX the set of decision nodes.
Next let I be a set of players i, and assign decision nodes to players by a playerassignment functionP. In brief, assume [OR4]P:X!I. Then associate with each player i a collectionH i of information setsH. Assume [OR5] (8i2I)H i partitions P 1 (i). Thus each player's information-set collectionH i partitions the player's set
This is the usual assumption that two nodes in the same information set must have the same feasible choices. By definition, an OR form h(C,N), (P, (H i ) i2I )i is an OR tree (C,N) together with a player set I, a player-assignment functionP, and a list
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely notes that the set of outcomes isN rX = (N rT )[(T rX ). The setN rT consists of the infinite sequences, and the setT rX consists of the nondecision finite sequences. Later, preferences can be defined overN rX , or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions overN rX .
3.2 The equivalence between choice-set forms and OR forms [OR6] states that two nodes in the same information set have the same alternatives. 9 As usual, define CH at eachH 2 [ i2IHi by (8t2H) CH = Ct . Thus CH is the set of alternatives at the information setH. An OR form has no shared alternatives iff
In other words, a form has no shared alternatives iff each of its information sets has its own alternatives. On the one hand, this condition is vacuous in the sense that one can always introduce enough alternatives so that each information set has its own alternatives. On the other hand, it is natural to repeatedly use the same alternatives in a repeated game.
An OR form has no absentmindedness iff Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 page 10) . In other words, a form has no absentmindedness iff none of its information sets contains both a node and a predecessor of that node. No-absentmindedness is regarded as a very weak assumption. It is explicitly incorporated into the game specification of Kuhn 1953 (page 48 Definition 2(II)), and is defended at length by AR16 (Section 4.2.3). Further, it is weaker 8 Peter A. Streufert than perfect recall, and AR16 (page 150) argues that a game without perfect recall "fails to capture rational behaviour".
No-absentmindedness plays a pivotal role in this section, as the following theorem demonstrates. In the theorem, the function R takes any sequence (c k ) K k=1 to its range. Consider the forward direction of the proposition. This paragraph notes how easy it is to derive injectivity when the form's information sets are ordered. Consider any noden. Since a choice determines its information set because of the no-sharedalternatives assumption, the choices in R(n) must be played in the order of their information sets. Hence the set R(n) determines the sequencen.
But the forward direction of Proposition 3.0 goes further. It shows that R|N is injective even when the form's information sets are unordered, provided only that no-absentmindedness holds. For example, consider 
10 Imagine that Spy 1 and Spy 2 are racing to recover a document from a safe deposit box. En route one spy realizes that if she reaches the box first, she can install a bomb that will explode when the other spy reaches the box after her. But then she realizes that the other spy will be thinking the same thing, and hence, if she opens the box when she reaches it, she will find either the document or an exploding bomb. So, she considers destroying the bank without opening the box in hopes of keeping the document from the other spy. can only be played in the order (f 2 , o 2 , o 1 ). Intuitively, this happens because the set {f 1 , o 1 , o 2 } contains f 1 , and because the set {f 2 , o 1 , o 2 } contains f 2 . This suggests that if a form has two choices whose order is not exogenously determined, then any sequence that lists the two choices must also list another choice (or set of choices) that determines their order. Showing that this can be done, whenever there is noabsentmindedness, is the interesting part of the proposition's proof.
Meanwhile, the reverse direction of Proposition 3.0 shows that no-absentmindedness is necessary for injectivity. For example, consider Figure 3 .2, which replicates the classic example of absentmindedness in Piccione and Rubinstein 1997 Figure 1 . Here R takes both the sequence (a) and the sequence (a, a) to the set {a}. Thus, R|N is not injective. The proposition's proof shows that something similar happens whenever no-absentmindedness is violated.
Theorem 3.1 uses the forward direction of Proposition 3.0 to show that every OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness is equivalent to a choiceset form. The reverse direction of Proposition 3.0 shows that Theorem 3.1 cannot be extended to include any OR forms that have absentmindedness.
Theorem 3.1 (choice-set OR) Suppose h(C,N), (P, (H i ) i2I )i is an OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. Define N = {R(n)|n2N}. Then (a) (C, N) is a choice-set tree and R|N is a bijection fromN onto N. Further, define
Conversely, Theorem 3.2 shows that every choice-set form is equivalent to an OR form with no shared alternatives and no absentmindedness. The theorem's proof constructs the OR form, and is the longest proof in the paper. (a) there is anN such that ([ i2I C i ,N) is an OR tree and R|N is a bijection fromN onto N. Further, deriveT , (Ct )¯t 2T , andX from this OR tree. Also defineP:X!I at eacht 2X by settingP(t) equal to the unique i for which Ct 
KS Forms
Definition
A KS form here is identical to a KS game (KL16 page 89) without the players' preferences. 11 The letters K and S refer to Kuhn 1953 and Selten 1975. Begin with a set T of nodes t, and a set E of edges e. By definition, a pair 
is a directed graph and r 2 T , and [KS2] for each t ] 2 T r {r} there is a unique finite walk from r to t ] . Call r the root node of the graph-tree. Further, let X = {t2T |(9t ] 2T )(t,t ] )2E} be the set of nodes with at least one successor, and call each t 2 X a decision node.
Next associate, with each node t 2 T , a set C t of feasible choices c. Such a feasible set can be empty. Further, associate, with each node t 2 T , a choice-to-successor function y t :C t !{t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E}, which is a bijection from t's feasible set C t of choices c onto the set {t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E} of nodes t ] that immediately succeed t. For future reference, call this bijectivity assumption
y t is a nonempty function. By definition, a KS augmented-tree h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T i is a KS graph-tree (T, E, r) together with a (C t , y t ) t2T consisting of feasible sets and choice-to-successor functions that satisfy [KS3] . Now introduce a set I of players i, and assign decision nodes to players by a player-assignment function P. Assume [KS4] P:X!I. Then associate with each player i a collection H i of information sets H. Assume [KS5] (8i2I) H i partitions P 1 (i). In other words, assume each player's information-set collection H i partitions the player's set P 1 (i) of decision nodes. Also assume [KS6] (8i2I, H2H i , t2H, t 0 2H) C t = C t 0 . Because of this, let C H denote the feasible-choice set at the information set H. By definition, a KS form h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T , (P, (H i ) i2I )i is a KS augmented-tree h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t i together with a player set I, a player-assignment function P, and a list (H i ) i2I of player information-set collections that satisfy
This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather, this paragraph merely suggests how other papers could add preferences to a KS form. Toward that end, take a KS form and let W r be the collection of (finite and infinite) walks from r. Then let W X r = { (t k ) K k=0 2W r | K<•, t K 2X } be the collection of (finite) walks from r to a decision node. Finally, let W r r W X r be the collection of outcomes. 12 It consists of 11 Several changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First, h(V, E, r), (A v , y v ) v2V )i in KL16 becomes h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T i here. Second, a "KS-tree" there becomes a "KS augmented-tree" here (this accords with note 4). Third, V D becomes X. Fourth, P and P f and P D become {(r)}[W r and {(r)}[W T r and {(r)}[W X r . Fifth, both p and w[{(r, (r))} become w. Sixth, i 2 N and (I i ) i2N become i 2 I and (H i ) i2I . Seventh, P i becomes P 1 (i).
12 This construction fails when |T | = 1, which is a trivial case. (In this case there are no walks.)
[i] the infinite walks from r, and [ii] the (finite) walks from r to nondecision nodes. Later, preferences can be defined over W r r W X r , or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over W r r W X r .
The Kline/Luckraz equivalence between OR forms and KS forms
Theorem 4.1 requires some additional notation. As in the previous paragraph, consider a KS form and let W r be the collection of walks from r. Next let Theorem 4.1 (OR KS) Suppose h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T , (P, (H i ) i2I )i is a KS form, and derive its W r . Define C = [ t2T C t . Also define a andN by letting a be the surjective function, from
a is a well-defined bijection and (C,N) is an OR tree. Further, derive w:T !{(r)}[W T r from the KS form by the previous paragraph. Also deriveT andX from the OR tree (C,N). Also defineP:X!I at eacht 2X 
5 Simple Forms
Definition
A simple form here is virtually identical to a simple extensive form in AR16 (page 146). 14 The difference is insignificant. 15 Let T be a set of nodes t, and let be a binary relation on T . A simple tree (AR16 page 143) is a pair (T, ) such that [s1] (T, ) is a partial ordering (AR16 page 20) with a maximum, [s2] (8s2T ) {t2T |t s} is a finite chain, and [s3] (8t2T,t A 2T ) t > 13 More details of my adaptations, of both KL16 and AR16, are available on request. 14 Some notational changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First, x 0 there becomes r here. Second, T = (N, ) there becomes (T, ) here. In other words, [a] N there becomes T here, and [b] T there has no equivalent here. 15 The difference is that [s4] strengthens the phrase before AR16 page 146 Definition 6.4 (SF1) by requiring that [1] no choiceĉ 2 [ i2IĈi contains r, and [2] no choiceĉ 2 [ i2IĈi equals ?. I argue that [1] and [2] are insignificant by considering the set p(ĉ) of nodes at which such choicesĉ would be feasible. Regarding [1] , supposeĉ did contain r. Then p(ĉ) = {p(t)|t2ĉ} would contain p(r), which is ill-defined. Regarding [2] , p(?) = {p(t ] )|t ] 2?} is empty, and thus ? is never feasible. t A implies (9t B 2T ) t > t B and neither t A t B nor t B t A . Define r = max T , and call r the root node. Say that t precedes t ] iff t is succeeded by t ] iff t > t ] . Let X ✓ T be the set of nodes t which have at least one successor, and call every such node t 2 X a decision node. Define p:T r {r}!X by p(t ] ) = min{t2T |t>t ] }, and call p(t ] ) the (immediate) predecessor of the node t ] (AR16, page 145) .
By assumption, a choiceĉ will be a nonempty set of non-root nodes t ] 2 T r {r}. In other words, each choiceĉ satisfies ? 6 =ĉ ✓ T r {r}. The set of nodes at which a choiceĉ is feasible is p(ĉ) = {p(t ] )|t ] 2ĉ} (AR16 page 145). Note that this equation is the standard way of defining the image of a set (such asĉ) under a function (such as p). Accordingly, p(ĉ) is the set of nodes p(t ] ) that immediately precede a node t ] inĉ. Further, let I be the set of players i, and let (Ĉ i ) i2I list a collectionĈ i of choiceŝ c for each player i.
At each decision node t 2 X, let A i (t) = {ĉ2Ĉ i |t2p(ĉ) } be the set of feasible choices for player i, and let J(t) = { i2I | A i (t)6 =? } be the set of decision makers. By definition, a simple (extensive) form (AR16 page 146, and note 15 here) is a triple (T, , (Ĉ i ) i2I ) such that (T, ) is a simple tree, [s4] eachĈ i is a collection of nonempty subsetsĉ of T r {r}, This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely notes that the outcomes of a simple form are the maximal chains of its simple tree (such chains can be finite or infinite). Later preferences can be defined over the collection of maximal chains, or more generally if appropriate assumptions are introduced, over some space of probability distributions over the collection of maximal chains.
The equivalence between KS forms and simple forms
The following two theorems are new. In both theorems, part (a) is more straightforward than part (b) .
The theorems use some minor conditions, all of which are discussed in Section 7.1. First, say that a simple form has no simultaneous decisions iff (8t2X) J(x) is a singleton. Second, say that a KS form has no absentmindedness iff (8H2[ i2I H i , t A 2H,t B 2H) there is not a walk from t A to t B . Third, say that a KS form has no trivial decisions iff (8t2T ) |C t | 6 = 1.
Theorem 5.1 (KS simple) Suppose (T, , (Ĉ i ) i2I ) is a simple form with no simultaneous decisions, and derive its r, p, and X. Define E = {(t,t ] )2T 2 |t=p(t ] )}.
Then (a) (T, E, r) is a KS graph-tree. Further, define (C t ) t2T at each t by C t = {ĉ2[ i2IĈi | t2p(ĉ) }. Also, define (y t :C t !{t ] 2T |(t,t ] )2E}) t2T at each t and eacĥ c2C t by letting y t (ĉ) be the unique element of p 1 (t)\ĉ. Also, define P:X!I at each t 2 X by letting P(t) equal to the unique i for which (9ĉ2Ĉ i ) t 2 p(ĉ). Finally, define (H i ) i2I at each i by H i = {p(ĉ)|ĉ2Ĉ i }. Then (b) h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T , (P, (H i ) i2I )i is a well-defined KS form with no absentmindedness and no trivial decisions. (Proof A.9.) Theorem 5.2 (KS ! simple) Suppose h(T, E, r), (C t , y t ) t2T , (P, (H i ) i2I )i is a KS form with no absentmindedness and no trivial decisions. Let > be { (t,t ] )2T 2 | there is a walk from t to t ] }, and let be 
AR Forms
Definition
An AR form here is virtually identical to a discrete extensive form in AR16 (page 138). 16 The difference is insignificant. 17 LetṄ be a nonempty collection of nonempty setsṅ. Define W = [Ṅ. CallṄ the set of nodesṅ, and call W the space of outcomes w. Notice that every nodeṅ is a subset of W . In other words, every nodeṅ is a set of outcomes w. By definition, the nodeṅ 2Ṅ precedes the nodeṅ ] 2Ṅ iffṅ is succeeded byṅ ] iffṅ ṅ ] . Note that W itself can be a member ofṄ. If so,ṅ = W is a node which precedes all other nodeṡ n ] 2Ṅ r {W }.
By definition, a (discrete) AR tree (AR16 page 47 Definition 2.4, AR16 page 112 Definition 5.1, and AR16 page 135 Definition 6.1) is a pair (Ṅ, ◆) which satisfies two sets of conditions. First, it satisfies [AR1] (Ṅ, ◆) is a partially ordered set, [AR2] W 2Ṅ, where W is defined to be [Ṅ, 18 [AR3] (8Ṅ ⇤ ✓Ṅ)Ṅ ⇤ is a chain iff (9w2W )(8ṅ ⇤ 2Ṅ ⇤ ) w 2ṅ ⇤ , and [AR4] (8w2W , w 0 2W ) w 6 = w 0 implies (9ṅ2Ṅ, n 0 2Ṅ) w 2ṅ rṅ 0 and w 0 2ṅ 0 rṅ . Call W the root node, and letẊ = {ṅ2Ṅ | (9ṅ ] 2Ṅ)
16 Some notational changes have been made to facilitate comparison across game specifications. First, the set W of plays w in AR16 becomes the set W of outcomes w here. Second, F(N) r {W } there becomeṡ T r {W } here. Third, a move x 2 X there becomes a decision nodeṫ 2Ẋ here. Fourth, T = (N, ◆) there becomes (Ṅ, ◆) here. In other words, [a] N there becomesṄ here, and [2] T there has no equivalent here ( [a] merits emphasis because note 14 in the previous section changed N to T ). 17 The difference is that [AR7] strengthens the phrase before AR16 page 138 Definition 6.2 (DEF1) by requiring that [1] no choiceċ 2 [ i2IĊi is equal to W , and [2] every choiceċ 2 [ i2IĊi is a superset of somė t ] 2 T r {W }. I argue that [1] and [2] are insignificant by considering the setṖ(ċ) of nodes at which such choicesċ would be feasible. Regarding [1] 
is not naturally defined. Regarding [2] , suppose thatċ 6 = W (by [1] 19 ThusṄ is partitioned by {Ṅ rṪ ,Ṫ rẊ ,Ẋ}.Ṅ rṪ is the set of nondecision nodes without immediate predecessors,Ṫ rẊ is the set of nondecision nodes with immediate predecessors, andẊ is the set of decision nodes. 20 Nondecision (i.e., "terminal") nodes are closely related to outcomes. In particular, nondecision nodes are singleton nodes in the sense that (8ṅ2Ṅ)ṅ / 2Ẋ iff (9w2W ) n = {w} (AR16 page 86 Lemma 4.1 (b) ). This does not implyṄ ◆ {{w}|w2W }. 21 However,Ṅ ◆ {{w}|w2W } does hold whenṄ is finite. Further, there is a compelling sense in which anyṄ can be expanded toṄ [ {{w}|w2W } without changing its meaning (AR16 page 50 Proposition 2.11). Now introduce a set I of players i, and letĊ i denote player i's set of choicesċ. By assumption, a choiceċ is a nonempty subset of W . Further, let P(ċ) denote the set of nodesṅ at which the choiceċ is feasible, and define it byṖ(ċ) = {ṗ(ṫ ] ) |ṫ ] 2Ṫ ,ċ◆ṫ ] , and (6 9ṫ2Ṫ )ċ◆ṫ ṫ ] } (AR16 page 134 Proposition 6.2(b)). ThisṖ is not related to the player-assignment functionsP and P of OR and KS forms.
At each decision nodeṫ 2Ẋ, let A i (ṫ) = {ċ2Ċ i |ṫ2P(ċ) } be the set of feasible choices for player i, and let J(ṫ) = { i2I | A i (ṫ)6 =? } be the set of decision makers. By definition, a (discrete) AR form (AR16 page 138, and note 17 here) is a triple (Ṅ, ◆, (Ċ i ) i2I ) such that (Ṅ, ◆) is a (discrete) AR tree, [AR7] everyċ 2 [ i2IĊi is a nonempty proper subset of W which is both the union of a subcollection ofṄ and a superset of some member ofṪ r {W },
AR16 (page 138) explains that [AR8]
states the standard properties of information sets, and that [AR9] describes how choices determine successors when simultaneous decisions are allowed. This paper does not formally specify preferences. Rather this paragraph merely recalls that the space W of outcomes is primitive (or, virtually the same, thatṄ is primitive and W is defined as [Ṅ). Thus it is straightforward to define preferences over W . Recent contributions which do so include Alós- Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016b , 2017b , and 2017c . More generally, preferences might be defined over some space of probability distributions over W , if appropriate assumptions are introduced. 19 [AR6] implies that each non-root node without an immediate predecessor is necessarily a nondecision node (AR16 page 135 Proposition 6.3, second sentence of proof). In other words, (Ṅ r {W }) rṪ ✓ (Ṅ r {W }) rẊ . This is equivalent toẊ r {W } ✓Ṫ r {W }. This impliesẊ ✓Ṫ since W 2Ṫ by definition,. 20 This sentence fails when |Ṅ| = 1, which is a trivial case. (In such a case W is a nondecision node.) 21 For example,Ṅ 6 ◆ {{w}|w2W } in the AR16 tree that Theorem 6.2 constructs from any simple tree having infinite maximal chains. This accords with the theorem's claim that the AR16 tree is orderisomorphic to the simple tree: neither the AR16 tree nor the simple tree has (nondecision) nodes corresponding to the simple tree's infinite maximal chains.
The Alós-Ferrer/Ritzberger equivalence between simple forms and AR forms
Theorem 6.1 (simple AR) Suppose (Ṅ, ◆, (Ċ i ) i2I ) is a (discrete) AR form, and derive its W ,ṗ, andṪ . Then (a) (Ṫ , ◆) is a simple tree. Further, define The order isomorphism in Theorem 6.2 means that there is a bijection j:T !Ṅ such that (8t2T,t ] 2T ) t t ] iff j(t) ◆ j(t ] ) (AR16 page 20). In this case, the bijection is T 3 t 7 ! {w2W |t2w} 2Ṅ (AR16 page 144 note 7).
Theorem 6.2 (simple ! AR) Suppose (T, , (Ĉ i ) i2I ) is a simple form. Let W be (T, )'s collection of maximal chains, and letṄ = { {w2W |t2w} | t2T }. Then (a) (Ṅ, ◆) is a (discrete) AR tree which is order-isomorphic to (T, ). Further, define 
(EDP)DEF).) 7 Advantages and Disadvantages
Four minor features of the five specifications
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 restrict OR forms by no absentmindedness and no shared alternatives. 22 Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 restrict KS forms by no absentmindedness and no trivial decisions, and also restrict simple forms by no simultaneous decisions. Absentmindedness, shared alternatives, trivial decisions, and simultaneous decisions are all features of game specifications. Each of these features corresponds to a row in " and "never" are conjectural.) Absentmindedness is listed first because it is the only feature whose absence limits the range of social interactions that can be modeled. At the same time, this limitation is very unimportant (Section 3.2, second paragraph). Absentmindedness is currently allowed in OR forms and KS forms, and might later be allowed in simple forms by removing [s7] . Absentmindedness is incompatible with choice-set forms (Proposition 3.0) and AR forms (AR16 Section 4.2.3).
OR forms and KS forms allow information sets to share alternatives (i.e., choices), and this can be convenient when defining a repeated game. Yet, disallowing shared alternatives is an innocuous assumption in the sense that one can always introduce enough alternatives so that each information set has its own alternatives. Choice-set forms disallow shared alternatives because {t2X|c2C t } (if nonempty) is the unique information set associated with the choice c (recall [s4] ).
Trivial decisions can be convenient for expanding game trees. Trivial decisions are currently allowed in choice-set forms, OR forms, and KS forms. It seems they might later be allowed in simple forms by altering [s3] and [s8], and in AR forms by pursuing AR16 pages 64-65.
Simultaneous decisions are more convenient than cascading information sets in the sense of AR16 pages 140-142. Simultaneous decisions are already built into simple forms and AR forms. A similar construction seems possible for choice-set forms, OR forms, and KS forms (see for example Osborne and Rubinstein 1994 page 102).
General discussion
Although none of the four features is that important, Table 7 .1 and the preceding paragraph argue that OR forms and KS forms have more features than choice-set forms and AR forms. Further, simple forms seem able to gain absentmindedness by removing [s7] and to gain trivial decisions by altering [s3] and [s8] . In this sense, the three middle specifications appear to be slightly more general than the two specifications on the ends. Now consider these three middle specifications in the context of Figure 1 .2. The left-right spectrum there is identical to the left-right spectrum in Table 7 .1. KS forms are special because both their nodes and their choices are abstract (see the top two rows of Figure 1 .2). This allows one to specify both nodes and choices flexibly, as desired. OR forms are less flexible but more efficient notationally since they express nodes in terms of choices. Symmetrically, simple forms are less flexible but more efficient notationally since they express choices in terms of nodes.
At the two ends of the spectrum, choice-set forms and AR forms sacrifice small amounts of generality for even more notational efficiency. In both cases, the extra efficiency is gained by using more set theory. For example, precedence becomes set inclusion: On the left, a choice-set form has t preceding t ] iff t ⇢ t ] , while on the right, an AR form hasṫ precedingṫ ] iffṫ ṫ ] .
As the last sentence suggests, the two spectrum ends are opposites in some sense. On the spectrum's left, nodes are expressed in terms of choices (see Figure 1. 2's top row). Since that is done in terms of past choices, the notation looks backward more efficiently. For example, it can be relatively easy [a] to find the product of the probabilities of past choices, [b] to sum the rewards and costs from past choices, or [c] to sum the infinite relative likelihoods of past choices (Streufert 2015a Sections 3.3 and 4.1) . In contrast, on the spectrum's right, nodes and choices are expressed in terms of outcomes (see Figure 1.2's top rows) . Since outcomes are in the future, this notation looks forward more efficiently. For example, it can be relatively easy [a] to abstractly analyze preferences over outcomes without even referring to the time horizon (Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger 2016b), or [b] to connect game forms with the standard statistical foundations of stochastic processes.
Although it is natural to have a favourite game specification, there appears to be no objective sense in which one game specification is best for all purposes. Thus it may be advantageous to be fluent in several specifications, so as to be able to freely choose the specification that best fits the purpose at hand.
A Proofs
Lemma A.1 Suppose T is a collection of finite subsets t of C. Then, for any s ✓ C, (a) there is an infinite chain T ⇤ in T such that [T ⇤ = s iff (b) there is (t m ) m 1 2 T • such that (8m 1) t m ⇢ t m+1 and [ m 1 t m = s.
Proof The reverse direction is proved by setting T ⇤ = {t m |m 1}.
To prove the forward direction, take any s and assume T ⇤ is an infinite chain in T such that [T ⇤ = s. Define (t m ) m 1 recursively by t 1 = min T ⇤ and (8m 2) t m = min T ⇤ r {t 1 ,t 2 , ...t m 1 }. Every step in this infinite recursion is well-defined because [a] T ⇤ is infinite by assumption and [b] every nonempty subcollection of T ⇤ has a minimum because T ⇤ is a chain of finite sets by assumption. By inspection, ( 8m 1 This paragraph shows by induction that (8m 0) m  |t m+1 |. The initial step (m = 0) is 0  |t 1 |, which holds trivially. The inductive step (m 1) is m = (m 1)+1  |t m |+1  |t m+1 |, where the first inequality holds by the inductive hypothesis and the second inequality holds by t m ⇢ t m+1 .
Finally take any c 2 s. Since s = [T ⇤ by assumption, there exists some t ⇤ 2 T ⇤ such that c 2 t ⇤ . Consider the element t |t ⇤ |+1 in the sequence (t m ) m 1 . Since both t ⇤ and t |t ⇤ |+1 belong to T ⇤ , and since T ⇤ is a chain, either t ⇤ ✓ t |t ⇤ |+1 or t ⇤ t |t ⇤ |+1 . The latter would imply |t ⇤ | > |t |t ⇤ |+1 |. Since this would contradict the previous paragraph
Proof Because of [OR3] , it suffices to show that ( 8k 1 
Proof Not (a) ) not (b) . Assume absentmindedness. Then there existH 2 [ i2IHi , t 2H, and`< K(t) such that 1t`2H . Since`< K(t),t`+ 1 is well-defined and satisfies t`+ 1 2C 1t`. Thus since 1t`a ndt share an information set, [OR6] impliest`+ 1 2Ct . Thus n =t (t`+ 1 ) is well-defined. Then [a] |{k 1|n k 2C 1t`} | is at least |{k 1|n k =t`+ 1 }| byt`+ 1 2 C 1t`; which [b] is at least |{`+1, K(t)+1 }| by the construction ofn; which [c] equals 2 by`< K(t).
Not (b) ) not (c). Letn 2N andt 2T be such that |{k 1|n k 2Ct }| 2. Then there are`and k such that`< k and {n`,n k } ✓ Ct . Thust belongs to both {t2T |n`2Ct } and {t2T |n k 2Ct }. These are information sets by Lemma A.3. Since these two information sets intersect, [OR4] and [OR5] imply that the two are equal. Note that 1nk 1 belongs to the latter. Thus it belongs to the former. In other words,n`2 C 1nk 1 . Thus t ⇤ = 1nk 1 (n`) is well-defined. Since`< k,t ⇤ is well-defined and equalsn`. Sincè and [c] t`=t k , both 1t` 1 and 1tk 1 belong to {t2T |t k 2Ct }. By Lemma A.3, this is an information set. Since`< k, the last two sentences imply that this information set contains both 1t` 1 and its successor 1tk 1 . 24 In the text, a sequence is denoted byn = (c k ) K k=1 for some K 2 {0, 1, 2,...}[{•}, and an initial segment is denoted by (c k ) L k=1 for some L < K (this resembles notation from Osborne and Rubinstein 1994) . In this appendix, the elements of a sequencen are denotedn k rather than c k , the length of a sequence is denoted K(n) 2 {0, 1, 2,...}[{•}, and an initial segment is denoted 1n`= (n 1 ,n 2 ,...n`) for some`< K(n).
Lemma A.5 (Establishes Proposition 3.0 and slightly more.) Consider an OR form with no shared alternatives. Then (a) there is no absentmindedness iff (b) R|T is injective iff (c) R|N is injective.
Proof Not (a) ) not (b) . Suppose there is absentmindedness. Then Lemma A.4 (a,c) implies there is a sequencet such that |R(t)| 6 = K(t). Since |R(t)| > K(t) is inconceivable, |R(t)| < K(t). Thus there exist indices 1 `< k  K(t) such that t`=t k . Hence R( 1tk 1 ) = R( 1tk ).
Not (b) ) not (c). This is obvious sinceT ✓N. Not (c) ) not (a) . Assume thatn 1 andn 2 are distinct elements ofN such that R(n 1 ) = R(n 2 ).
On the one hand, suppose there does not exist a k 1 such thatn 1 k 6 =n 2 k . Then
. Without loss of generality, assume the former. Sincē n 1 6 =n 2 by assumption,n 2
exists. Thus since R(n 1 ) = R(n 2 ) by assumption, K(n 1 ) 6 = 0 and there exists some` K(n 1 ) such thatn 1 =n 2
. But the assump-
impliesn 1 =n 2 , and thus the last sentence impliesn 2 =n 2
). This implies absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a,c) .
On the other hand, suppose there exists a k 1 such thatn 1 k 6 =n 2 k . Then let`be the smallest such k. Then [a] 
, where the equalities hold by two applications of Lemma A.4(a, c) , and where the inequality holds because R(t [ ) ✓ R(t). This is the first of the lemma's two conclusions. For the second conclusion, it suffices to show that 1t
For this, it suffices that the next two paragraphs show,
and [c] imply that {t`,t 1 } ✓ C {} . This and [b] imply that |{k 1|t k 2C {} }| 2. This is inconsistent with no absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a, b) .
For the inductive step at k 2 {2, 3, ...
[3] and [5] imply {t`,t k } ✓ C 1tk 1 . This and [4] imply |{k 0 1|t k 0 2C 1tk 1 }| 2. This is inconsistent with no absentmindedness by Lemma A.4(a, b) . 
, where the first equality holds by Lemma A.4(a, c) , and where the rest holds by inspection. This implies that |R(n)| is infinite. Thus [b] implies |t| is infinite. This contradicts [a] .
, which is the second fact to be derived. Also and by Lemma A.4(a, c) again. This andt [ (c) =t yield c / 2 R(t [ ), which is the first fact to be derived.
). Because of Claim 4, it suffices to show the reverse direction. Toward that end, assume Lemma A.4(a, c) , by [i] and [ii] , and by Lemma A.4(a,c) again. So, trivially,
The last two sentences yield [a] t [ = 1tK(t) 1 .
[i] and [ii] yield [b] R(t) r R(t [ ) ✓ {c}. [a] and [b] 
Claim 6: Take t 2 T r {{}}. Then (a) (R|T ) 1 (t) is a well-defined sequence in T and (b) Claim 7: [cs2] holds. Take t 6 = {}. It must be shown that t has a unique last choice. Claim 6 establishes that the last elements of the sequence (R|T ) 1 (t) are identical to the last choices (Section 2) of the set t. Since the sequence (R|T ) 1 (t) is nonempty because the set t is nonempty, the sequence has a unique last element. By the previous two sentences, the set t has a unique last choice. 
.
[e] and [f] Second, [cs2] implies the existence of a function c ⇤ :T r {{}}!C that takes each nonempty t 2 T to its unique last choice c ⇤ (t). Third, define
Definition of (Q k ) k 0 . This paragraph recursively defines a sequence (Q k ) k 0 of surjective functions which map choice sets to choice sequences. More precisely, each Q k will map each t 2 T k to some finite sequence in C. To begin, define the oneelement function Q 0 :T 0 !Q 0 (T 0 ) by Q 0 ({}) = {}. Note that the codomain of Q 0 has been set equal to its range Q 0 (T 0 ) = {{}}. Then, for any k 1, use Q k 1 to define [b] T k 1 is the domain of the function Q k 1 which was defined in the last step of the recursion. Also note that the codomain of Q k has been set equal to its range Claim 5: (8k 0,t2T k ) K(Q k (t)) = k. This can be shown by induction. The initial step (k = 0) holds because T 0 = {{}} by the definition of T 0 , and because K(Q 0 ({})) = K({}) = 0 by the definition of Q 0 . The inductive step (k 1) holds because for any t 2 T k , K( Q k (t) ) equals K( Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) (c ⇤ (t)) ) by the definition of Q k , which equals K( Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) ) + 1 by inspection. This equals (k 1) + 1 by [a] the inductive hypothesis and [b] the fact that t r {c ⇤ (t)} 2 T k 1 by t 2 T k and [cs2]. Finally, (k 1) + 1 = k.
The ✓ direction follows from Claim 5 at k. Conversely, take any [a] t 2T such that [b] K(t) = k. By [a] and the ✓ direction of Claim 4, there are k 0 0 and 
Claim 7: (8t2T r {{}}) 1tK(t) 1 2T . Fixt 2T r {{}}. Notet 2 Q K(t) (T K(t) ) by Claim 6. Thus there is t 2 T K(t) such thatt = Q K(t) (t). Sincet 6 = {} by assumption, K(t) 1. The last two sentences and the definition of Q K(t) implyt = Q K(t) (t) = Q K(t) 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) (c ⇤ (t)). I argue [a] 1tK(t) 1 = Q K(t) 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) by the previous sentence; which [b] belongs to Q K(t) 1 (T K(t) 1 ) by t 2 T K(t) and [cs2]; which [c] is a subset ofT by Claim 4.
Claim 8: ([ i2I C i ,N) is an OR tree. Because of Claims 1-3, it suffices to show that [OR2] holds for K < •. Toward that end, take anyn 2N and any` 0 such that < K(n) < •. By K(n) < • and the definition ofT ,n 2T . Thus 1n`b elongs toT by K(t) `applications of Claim 7; which is a subset ofN by the definition ofT .
Claim 9: (a) [ k 0 Q k : T !T is well-defined and (b) (8t2T ) ([ k 0 Q k )(t) = Q |t| (t). Take t 2 T . The definition of (T k ) k 0 implies [1] t 2 T |t| and [2] (T k ) k 0 partitions T . [1] and [2] imply ([ k 0 Q k )(t) is [3] well-defined and [4] equal to Q |t| (t). Also, ([ k 0 Q k )(t) equals Q |t| (t) by [4] ; which belongs to Q |t| (T |t| ) by [1] ; which is a subset ofT by Claim 4. (a) Claim 10: (8k 0,t2T k ) R(Q k (t)) = t. This can be shown by induction. The initial step (k = 0) holds because T 0 = {{}} by the definition of T 0 and because R(Q 0 ({})) = R({}) = {} by the definition of Q 0 . To see the inductive step, take any k 1 and any t 2 T k . Then R( Q k (t) ) [a] equals R Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) (c ⇤ (t)) by the definition of Q k , which [b] equals R Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) [ {c ⇤ (t)} by inspection, which [c] equals t r {c ⇤ (t)} [ {c ⇤ (t)} by the inductive hypothesis, which [d] equals t.
Claim 11: R|T :T !T is the inverse of [ k 0 Q k . Claim 10 implies that (8k 0) R| Q k (T k ) = Q 1 k and that it maps from Q k (T k ) onto T k . Claim 6 implies that the members of {Q k (T k )|k 0} are disjoint. The definition of (T k ) k 0 implies that the members of {T k |k 0} are disjoint. The last three sentences imply that R| [ k Q k (T k ) = ([ k 0 Q k ) 1 and that it maps from [ k 0 Q k (T k ) onto [ k 0 T k . This is equivalent to the claim because [a] [ k 0 Q k (T k ) =T by Claim 4 and because [b] [ k 0 T k = T by the definition of (T k ) k 0 . [a] Q k 1 (t [ ) (c) = Q k (t) is equivalent to Q k 1 (t [ ) (c) = Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) (c ⇤ (t)) by the definition of Q k ; which [b] is equivalent to the combination of Q k 1 (t [ )=Q k 1 (t r {c ⇤ (t)}) and c=c ⇤ (t) by rearrangement; which [c] is equivalent to t [ =t r {c ⇤ (t)} and c=c ⇤ (t) by applying R to both sides of the first equality and then simplifying it via Claim 11; which [d] [a] . Two applications of Claim 6 imply K(Q |t [ | (t [ )) = |t [ | and K(Q |t| (t)) = |t|.
This and [a] imply |t| 1 and |t [ | = |t| 1. Hence [a] and the forward direction of Claim 12 at k = |t| imply [b] . Conversely, assume [b] . [b] implies |t| 1 and |t [ | = |t| 1. Hence [b] and the reverse direction of Claim 12 at k = |t| imply [a] . .
[e] and [f] Claim 27: {R(n)|n2N} = N. The ✓ direction holds by Claim 25. For the converse, take any n 2 N. If n 2 T , the result follows from Claim 11. If n / 2 T , the result follows from Claim 26. Claim 1: (a) (T, E, r) is a KS graph-tree, (b) (8t2T,t ] 2T ) t > t ] iff there is a walk from t to t ] , and (c) the decision-node set derived from (T, ) equals the decision node set derived from (T, E, r). ((c) will be used implicitly to ensure that the symbol X is unambiguous). A simple tree is specified via order theory, while a KS graph-tree is specified via graph theory. The conversion from the former to the latter is relatively straightforward. Details are available on request.
